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S U M M A R Y 
 
 
Political trust remains one of the most elusive topics in political science research. On the one 
hand, we expect that critical citizens display some form of distrust toward those who hold 
power within a political system. Some authors have even claimed that expressing trust in 
politicians is even logically inconsistent. While it makes sense to expect that most people will 
express trust toward their relatives, partners and friends, there is much less to be said about 
expressing trust toward, e.g., the Prime Minister. Given the fact that most citizens do not 
know the Prime Minister personally, in general they will not have access to sufficient 
information about the personal trustworthiness of the Prime Minister to arrive at a qualified 
judgement (Hardin 1993). On the other hand, most political scientists will, explicitly or 
implicitly, agree with the fact that the measurement of political trust can function as a 
thermometer to assess the health and vitality of a political system. Low or declining levels of 
political trust usually only spell trouble for democratic stability. The fact that trust in the US 
President, e.g., has been caught in a downward spiral since the early 1970‟s limits the capacity 
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of the American political system to provide more public goods to the population 
(Hetherington 2004). 
Apparently, political trust still functions as an important resource for the legitimacy of 
political systems, as Almond and Verba argued almost half a century ago in their classic work 
on The Civic Culture (1963). Given the salience and the continuing elusiveness of political 
trust for the current academic debate, it is clear that the article by Justin Fisher, Jennifer van 
Heerde and Andrew Tucker (2010) in this journal is of paramount importance. Fisher et al. 
criticize the standard measurement of political trust as a simple one-dimensional construct. 
Based on an extensive review of the literature, they argue that at least three forms of political 
trust should be distinguished, both for theoretical as for empirical reasons. Strategic trust 
results from a judgement about the trustworthiness of the other actor, and an assessment of the 
odds that one‟s own legitimate interests will be harmed or not by this actor. Moral trust, on 
the other hand, focuses on the moral commitment to be trustworthy, and the expectation that 
this imperative will equally apply to other members of society. Deliberative trust, finally, 
focuses on deliberative and representative procedures, that will help to ensure proper conduct 
by political decision-makers. The authors subsequently use recent data sources to demonstrate 
that these various forms of trust are related to trust in political parties and trust in institutions. 
The conclusion is that “forms of trust may vary by institution” (Fisher et al., 2010, 182). 
Fisher and his colleagues have made an extremely important and well-argued contribution to 
the debate. Within the literature, political trust has been a topic that does not receive sufficient 
theoretical consideration. Most scholars simply use the standard survey items on „trust in 
government‟, without questioning their validity, or even wondering what political trust 
actually refers to, or what place the concept could have in democratic society. The 
contribution of Fisher et al. therefore needs to be applauded. Nevertheless, my claim is that 
their distinction between three forms of political trust is not well grounded, both conceptually 
as empirically and this distinction could misguide the future academic debate. I want to 
address these concerns before drawing some conclusions on what this implies for our 
understanding of the way citizens make judgements about the trustworthiness of politicians 
and the political system. I agree that in an ideal world, the basic tenet of Fisher et al. would be 
correct: citizens should arrive at a different trust decision for each and every political 
institution. In practice, however, we can observe that all these different evaluations are being 
summarized into one comprehensive and one-dimensional expression of political trust. A 
likely explanation for this pattern is that political trust can be conceptualized as a 
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comprehensive evaluation of the political culture that is prevailing within a political system 
and not as an evaluation of each and every actor individually. 
(…) 
We replicate the analysis by the authors on the March 2009 panel of the British Election 
Study (n=1,080). 
 
Table 1. Factor analysis of Political Trust Items in British Election Study 2009 
  Model I Model II 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 
I can find a political party that reflects my views  .549 .210 .542 .179 
The winning party usually reflects some of my views .517 .274 .478 .378 
When parties win power, they usually do what they say 
they would .709 -.344 .728 -.221 
The issues politicians consider, reflect my concerns .638 .278 .604 .348 
Politicians discuss the issues that are most important for 
Britain .717 .010 .690 .164 
Party activists are just like me .619 -.244 .620 -.106 
Parties bring together different kind of people to achieve 
common goals .667 -.034 .641 .140 
We need politicians that are able to debate complex issues .638 .295 .605 .354 
Politicians consider my concerns .757 -.271 .765 -.137 
It is more important that elections are democratic, than 
which party gains power .256 .672 .195 .619 
Parties represent their supporters, not just those who fund 
them .701 -.195 .697 -.040 
Politicians discussing the issue is more important to me 
than the outcome .443 .380 .407 .357 
Politicians deliver on their promises .742 -.284 .768 -.200 
Trust in Political parties   .725 -.448 
Trust in Politicians   .733 -.454 
Eigen Value 5.11 1.25 5.98 1.51 
Explained Variance 39.27 9.62 39.86 10.04 
Entries are the result of a Principal Component Analysis, on the March 2009 panel of the British Election Study 
(n=1,018).  
 
 
First, in Model I, we bring together the twelve items that Fisher et al. use to construct their 
three forms of political trust. The results unequivocally demonstrate that there are no three 
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distinct factors. Basically, 11 of the 12 items load on the first strong factor (Eigen value 5.11), 
providing strong evidence for the one-dimensional character of political trust. Only the item 
claiming that the most important thing about elections is that they must be democratic, loads 
quite strongly on a second (but much less powerful: Eigen value of 1.25) factor. This is the 
kind of analysis that Fisher et al. should have done to support their claim that there are three 
distinct forms, but the result is clearly that political trust basically is one-dimensional.  
In Model II we go a step further, by also including the two dependent variables they use in the 
same factor analysis. Again the results are easy to interpret: the two „dependent‟ variables are 
just an element of the same latent concept. Trust in political parties loads unequivocally on 
this scale, just as the belief that political parties will deliver on their promises. As such, the 
relation between these variables is tautological. 
We can demonstrate this also in a different way. We follow the logic of the authors, and we 
use a regression model to explain trust in political parties, by using the belief that parties will 
do what they say as an independent variable. We include this as the only independent variable 
in our model. The result is an incredibly strong model with a standardized regression 
coefficient of .49, a t-value of 17.4 and 24 per cent explained variance. Let‟s say that 
everyone who is familiar with survey research would be highly cautious if one single item 
took care of 24 per cent explained variance, as this usually means that the relation one 
investigates is tautological, not causal. 
 
(…) 
There are two likely explanations for the apparent one-dimensionality of political trust. The 
first one results from a deficiency model: it is assumed that citizens are simply too „lazy‟ or 
not sufficiently knowledgeable to form a distinct judgement on all the institutions listed in the 
standard battery. Since they are cognitive misers, they just focus on the person or institution 
that is most often featured in the news (the Prime Minister, or the President) and subsequently 
generalize this attitude toward all kind of political institutions without bothering further trying 
to assess whether this generalization is founded.  
A second possible explanation, however, could be that citizens can sincerely believe that the 
trustworthiness of all political institutions will overlap to some extent. This heuristic device is 
not unlikely, given the fact that political systems basically have one joint political culture, and 
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this culture determines whether politicians are trustworthy or not. I might disagree with the 
ideas of a specific political party, but it is highly unlikely that all MP‟s of this party would be 
corrupt, while all the MP‟s of other parties are not. All of them share the norms of the same 
political culture, and therefore they will behave in the same corrupt or trustworthy manner. 
Self-evidently politicians from a major ruling party are more likely to be targeted by bribery 
efforts or corruption than politicians from a fringe opposition party, but basically we can 
expect that these opposition politicians would do exactly the same, given the opportunity to 
do so. Therefore, as a heuristic short cut, it makes sense to arrive at a comprehensive 
judgement on political trust, since we know the behaviour of politicians and institutions will 
be determined mainly by the political culture, which is a system characteristic, not a 
characteristic of the specific institution. 
At first sight, we have no reason to prefer one of the two explanations for the one-
dimensionality of political trust scales. If the first line of reasoning would be more 
convincing, however, we should be able to observe that the one-dimensionality of the political 
trust battery is weakened by political and cognitive sophistication. Knowledgeable citizens 
would judge every institution on its own merits, less knowledgeable citizens would simply 
lump them all together. Following this line of reasoning, we would expect a negative relation 
between the education level of respondents and the one-dimensionality of their answers on 
this scale. This however, proves not to be the case, even on the contrary. If we again refer to 
the European Social Survey (3
rd
 wave), we can observe that the one-dimensionality of the 
scale even slightly increases with education level. While among the lowest educated the scale 
has an Eigen value of 4.32 (with 61.8 per cent explained variance), these figures are even a bit 
higher among those who pursued higher education. It can be safely assumed, therefore that 
the one-dimensionality of the scale is not caused by a lack of political knowledge, political 
interest or political sophistication. The one-dimensionality of the scale is clearly not the result 
of some sort of cognitive deficiency.  
This renders the second explanation more plausible: political trust can be considered as a 
comprehensive assessment of the political culture that is prevalent within a political system, 
and that is expected to guide the future behavior of all political actors. This expectation is not 
without any empirical grounds. Looking at studies on corruption, there are no examples of 
countries where Members of Parliament would be corrupt but the government is clean. The 
degree of trustworthiness is therefore not an individual characteristic of a person, not even of 
a political party or an institution but of the political system as a whole. As such it makes sense 
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that my opinion on various actors loads on a single latent variable. Given the fact that political 
culture is a system characteristic, and unless one can show me a country where ministers are 
very corrupt, and Members of Parliament are very honest, there is no reason to differentiate 
my trust judgement for those two political institutions. Citizens most likely will not have read 
the work by Almond and Verba on the importance of political culture, but it is clear that in 
their assessment of political institutions they apply the same logic on the importance of norms 
guiding the behaviour of political decision makers. 
 
 
 
